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JOSIAH ROYCE ON SELF AND COMMUNITY 
by Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley 
Josiah Royce's life-long concern was to  explicate adequately the no- 
tions of "self" and "community" and their fundamental interdepen- 
dence.' In doing so, he strove to avoid any form of atomistic, reduction- 
istic individualism, on the one hand, and flagrant collectivism, on the 
other hand. Instead, he argued that the searches for self, for truth, for 
an ethical, political, or  religious ideal must necessarily be both individual 
and communal enterprises. This argument leads Royce to a number o f  
important philosophical insights too  long neglected in both philosophical 
and scientific circles, but sorely needed after years of domination by Car- 
tesian, Humean, or  Existential atomism. Too  long has human experience 
been characterized as a passive, atomistic, and highly individualistic 
affair; and privacy, guilt, and responsibility have been either ignored or  
recklessly e ~ a l t e d . ~  Royce's views on self and community, it will be seen, 
take us beyond all worn-out dichotomies o f  mind-body, spiritualism- 
materialism, freedom-determinism, egoism-altruism, to  a refreshing new 
holistic view. 
ROYCE'S THEORY OF SELF 
Four important questions about the self a re  dealt with and answered 
by Royce, namely: (1) What is a self? (2) How is a self developed? (3) 
How is the self known? and (4) What gives a self its unique identity? 
The answers briefly are: (1) The  self is a process, not a thing, a process 
having both a public, physical, and behavorial aspect and a private, inner 
aspect; (2) the self is developed out of a process of social interaction vis- 
i-vis a contrast effect; (3) the self is never known directly, but  only 
Jacquelyn Kegley is Associate Professor of Philosophy at California State College, 
Bakersfield. 
3 4 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
through a communal process of interpretation; and (4) what gives the self 
its unique identity is an act of will, indeed, an act of love. 
The self, for Royce, can never be categorized as a thing, but must 
always be seen as a process, as developing serially in time. H e  categor- 
ically rejects any Cartesian notion of the self as an  independent substance 
only temporarily embodied and involved with the realm of nature. 
"Whatever the self is, it is not a Thing. It is not, in AristotIe's sense, 
. . . a Substance."' Further, one cannot speak of self as independent of 
and separate from either nature or body. Royce affirms both the role of 
genetic and physiological elements in the development of the self and the 
affinity of  human conscious life with nature. 
In the second volume of The World and the Individual, Royce dis- 
cusses four characteristics common to  both unconscious and conscious 
nature, namely, tendencies to ( I )  irreversibility, (2) communication, (3) 
formation of habits, and (4) evolutionary gr0wth.j A11 of these, we shall 
see, are important to Royce's understanding of the self.s Further, Royce 
puts forth three hypotheses about nature: 
( I )  The vast contrast which we have been taught t o  make between ma te r~a l  and con- 
scious processes really depends merely upon the accidents of the human  point o f  
view. . . ." 
(2) . we have n o  r ~ g h t  whatever t o  speak of really unconscious Nature, but only 
o f  i lncomrn~~nicat ive  Nature . . . .' 
(3) . . . in the case of Nature in general, a s  In t h e  case of the particular forms of 
Nature known as  ou r  fellowmen, we  are  dealing with phenomenal signs of a vast 
contcious process, whose r e l a t~on  to  Time vanes  vastly, but whose general character- 
i.jtlcs a r e  throughout the same.8 
Whatever difficulties there may be with such a pan-psychic view of 
reality, it has some merits in light of recent developments in both psy- 
chology and philosophy. Unlike Descartes, who saw all the animal king- 
dom in terms of machines, Royce allows that a study of other conscious 
organisms may lead to valuable insights about the human self. His view 
is more consonant with new interest in animal language, intelligence, and 
rights. I t  also cautions us against the substantialization we seem to 
engage in when dealing with mind, brain, or  body.9 
Royce emphasizes not only the continuity of the human self with 
nature, but also our common-sense experience of an empirical self. "The 
concept of the human self, like the concept of Nature, comes to  us, first, 
as an empirical concept, founded upon a certain class of  experience^."'^ 
The empirical self is constituted by both public and private experiences. 
A self is a certain totality of facts. Among such facts are the predomi- 
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nantly corporeal ones, such as countenance, body, clothing, and  physical 
actions-facts that both the self and others may observe and comment 
on." Royce even acknowledges that if these facts radically changed, so 
would the self.12 He also recognizes bodily continuity and the sense of a 
body as a criterion of self identity, though not the ultimate criterion.'' 
In addition to these public facts there is for Royce a set of  inner, 
private facts of equal empirical status and importance for the self. 
In addition to the external or corporeal Self of the phenomenal world, there is the 
equally empirical and phenomenal Self of the inner life, the series of states of con- 
sciousness, the feelings, thoughts, desires, memories, emotions, moods. These again, 
both my neighbor and myself regard as belong~ng to me, and as golng to make up 
what I am. ' "  
Further, as I have pointed out elsewhere,I5 unlike some behaviorists, 
Royce not only acknowledged consciousness and states of consciousness 
as important aspects of the self, but he also, before Husserl and other 
phenomenologists, stressed the intentionality of consciousness. According 
to Royce, mental acts are always directed toward objects, and also intend 
the object as having such-and-such meaning, as viewed in such-and-such 
a way.I6 Early in his career, Royce discussed the role of selective at-  
tention in all acts of consciousness. Attention selects only a few from the 
numerous impressions impinging on our sensibilities; many impressions 
slip through our consciousness without being retained or having any 
effect. Attention even modifies the quality of our impressions. Royce 
concludes his discussion of attention by writing: 
Attention seems to defeat, in part, its own object. Bringing something into the field of 
knowledgeseems to be a modifying, if not a transforming process." 
The intentional nature of consciousness reveals that the self engages in 
meaning-seeking, meaning-conferring activity. I t  further suggests that 
knowledge is obtained by a necessarily communal process. If I see the world 
from particular points of view, the only way I can transcend my narrowness 
and subjectivity is by checking things out with my fellows. Objectivity is 
intersubjectivity. Indeed, for Royce, knowledge both of self and of the 
external world is grounded in social interaction. Throughout his 
philosophical career, Royce argued that the self could never be considered a 
datum, but rather that self-consciousness arises out of a social contrast be- 
tween the self and the not-self, between what is mine and what is not mine. 
Royce writes: 
I affirm that our empirical self-consc~ousness, from moment to moment, depends upon 
a series o f  contrast effects, whose psychological origin lies in our l~teral  social life, and 
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whose continuance in our present conscious Ilfe, whenever we are atone, I S  due to  h a b ~ t ,  
to our memory of literal social relations, and to an Imaginative idealization of these 
 relation^.'^ 
Royce describes the process of coming to self-consciousness as follows: 
Nobody amongst us men comes to self-consc~ousness, so far as I know, except under the 
persistent influence of his social fellows. A child in the earlier stages of his social 
development . . . shows you, as you observe him, a process of development of self-con- 
sc~ousness in whlch, at every stage, the Self of the child grows and forms itself through 
Imitation, and through functions that cluster about the Imitation of others, and that are 
secondary thereto. . . . And his self-consciousness, as it grows, feeds upon soclal 
models, so that at every stage of his awakening l ~ f e  his consciousness of the Alter is a 
step in the advance of his consciousness. His playmates, h ~ s  nurse, or mother, or the 
workmen whose occupations he sees, and whose power fascinates him, appeal to his 
~m~tativeness and set him copies for his activities. He learns his little arts, and as he does 
so, he contrasts h ~ s  own deeds with those of his models, and o r  other children. Now 
contrast IS, m otrr conscious life, tile tnother of clearness. What the chrld does ~nstrnc- 
trvely, and wrtho~rt cotnparison wrth the deeds of others, t7ia.v never cotne to his clear 
consciorrsness as his own deeds at all. What he learns imitatively, and then reproduces, 
perhaps in joyous obstinacy, as  an act that enables him to display himyelf over against 
others-thls constitutes the beginning of his self-consc~ous life." 
Royce does not need to struggle, as do Descartes and Husserl, to ex- 
plain how we know other minds. We are first with other selves and only 
later become differentiated, unique selves. Of course, I will see others as 
conscious actors not only because by observing their acts I become a con- 
scious actor, but also because they aid me in developing my self in new 
directions. 
Our fellows are known to be real and have their own inner life, because they are for each 
of us the endless treasury of more rdeas. They answer our questions; they tell us news; 
they make comments, they pass judgments; they express novel cornb~nations of feelings; 
they relate to  us stories, they argue with us, and take counsel with us. . . . Our fello+vs 
ftrrtlrsh us the constat~tly needed s~rppletnenl to  our o wn fragmenrary tneanrt~gs.'~ 
Further, without my fellows I would have no knowledge of that which 
we call "extertlal reality." Royce points out that community experience dis- 
tinguishes inner from outer, the outer world being the world whose presence 
can be indicated only by definable, communicable experience.'' He further 
notes that spatial definiteness is important to externality because only the 
definitely IocalizabIe in space can be independently verified and agreed 
upon by a number of socialIy communicating beings." Finally, the data of 
sight and sound are more reliable because they are most open to social 
confirmation. We can grasp and see a pole together or lift a weight, but we 
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cannot literally share smells and tastes." For Royce, our knowledge of the 
external is fundamentally bound up  with our being-with-others. 
Our belief in the reality of Nature, when Nature is taken to mean the realm of  physi- 
cal phenomenon known to common sense and to science, is inseparab[v bound trp wrth 
our belief in [he e,Yrsrence of our fellorv 1r7etl. The one bel~ef cannot be understood 
apart from the other. Whatever the deeper real~ty behind Nature may turn out to 
be-our Nature, the realm of matter and of laws uith whtch our science and our popu- 
lar oplnlons have to do, is a realm tvh~ch we conceive as known or knobvabIe to vcrrrous 
men in precisely the general sense in which we regard it as known or knowable to our 
private selves. Take away the social factor in our present view of Nature, and you would 
alter the most essential characters possessed for us, by that physlcal realm In which we 
all belleve.'" 
Our selves, then, are essentially social in nature because self develops 
only in a social context; self-knowledge as well as knowledge of the external 
world are social affairs. Indeed, for Royce, the self is a community, for the 
self is in part its memory, its history. Furthermore, in developing self- 
consciousness, the individual comes to a different level of consciousness, 
namely, that of idealization. This brings an  interesting change. 
Hereby the contrast between Ego and Alter, no longer conflried to the relat~ons between 
my l~teral neighbor and myself, can be ref~ned Into the conscious contrasts between 
pre\ent and past self, between my self-critlcal and my naive Self, between my hrgher and 
lower self, o r  between my conscience and my ~ m p u l ~ e s ,  My reflectibe I~fe,  as I I  em- 
pir~cally occurs to me moment to moment, is a sort of abstract and epltotne of my whole 
social I~fe,  viewed as to those aspects which I find peculiarly s~gnificant. And r h u ~  my 
ekperlence of myself gets a provis~onal unity.?' 
Thus,  the continuity of the self is a continuity born of community ex- 
perience and dialogue; a common theme is developed. Indeed, Royce sees 
self-reflection as interpretation of a self t o  itself. Suppose I remember a 
former promise. I a m  then interpreting this bit of my past self t o  my 
future self, and I may say t o  myself, "I am committed to  d o  thus and 
so." "In brief," says Royce, "my idea of  myself is an  interpretation of 
my past-linked also with an interpretation of my  hopes and intentions 
as t o  my future."26 My self, then, for Royce, is a series of in- 
terpretations-we achieve the unification of separate ideas and experience 
through interpretation. The  self is a temporal, ongoing process, unified 
by continual communication and reflection. The self continually confers 
meaning on itself. 
This brings us directly to Royce's third base for personal identity and 
continuity, namely, ethical value. Self is also a n  expression of purpose. As I 
am remembered past, I am also an intended future. I set goals and make 
value judgments about what is worth doing, thinking, and seeking. With 
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Sartre, Royce sees the self as essentially moral, expressing in words, beliefs, 
and acts its opinion as to what things ought to  be like, including what kinds 
o f  persons should be created. 
Unlike Sartre, however, Royce does not see atomistic, individualistic 
selves making their own anxiety-filled, anguished, forlorn decisions. 
Rather, the self makes its decisions always in a social context. My meaning 
and plan always are a part of a totality of meanings and plans. Just as I 
contrast my present self with my past and future selves, so I contrast my 
plan and ideal with those of others. 
By (his meaning of tny 11fe-plan, by this possessron of an rdeal, by thrs Intent 
alrvays lo renlarn anolher than tny fe l low despite my dtvrnely planned unrry wirh 
(hem-by rhrs, and not by possesston of any Soul-Substance, Ia rn  definedand createda 
Self. " 
Not only does Royce define the self in terms of purpose and ideal, but 
also he ties together will and individuality. "1 am a Will, a will which is not 
there for the sake of something else, but which exists solely because it 
deserves to exist."28 Royce sees individuality in terms of a n  act of loyalty 
and love. His emphasis is upon love as a form of exclusive interest that we 
devote to a being or an object. The love we have for a being makes us 
declare it unique of its kind, irreplaceable and without any possible 
equivalent. If a child loves his broken toy soldier, he will not be consoled by 
a replacement. At the root of love is a spontaneous affirmation, namely, 
"There shall be no other." "The individual is primarily the object and 
expression of a n  exclusive interest, of a determinate s e l e ~ t i o n . " ~ ~  
This means, first of all, that the individual is n o  mere specification of a 
universal. It means also that I must choose my ideal, be loyal to it, love it. It 
means too that the self is primarily a seeker, a self trying to find itself. I 
learn who I am and who I might be, what interests and capacities I have, 
what selves I d o  not want to be because they d o  not realize my true self. I d o  
this continuously and in contrast t o  other selves and ideals. For Royce, the 
journey toward self-discovery and self-achievement is continuous, because 
individuality can never be achieved by finite experience. He  declares in- 
dividuality to  be "a category of satisfied will,"3o but he  also makes i t  clear 
that in time there is n o  satisfied will." In the world of time, seeking differs 
from attainment, the future is always ahead of us. 
The true or metaphysically real Ego of a man . . , is simply the totaltty of his experience 
in so far as he consctously views this experience, as, In ~ t s  meaning, the struggling but 
never completed expression of his coherent plan in life, the changing but never com- 
pleted partial embodiment of his own ideal." 
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Each self, as a temporal finite being, embodies a limited perspective 
and thus our meanings, our goals, etc., can only be partial. This is why we 
must transcend ourselves in community, seeking wider and wider perspec- 
tives and broader goals and ideals. Further, to give exclusive love, ultimate 
commitment, as Paul Tillich has argued, promises infinite fulfillment, but it 
also involves infinite risk, for we can suffer ultimate disappointment, as did 
many a Nazi in World War  11. The broader and more ultimate our goal, the 
less chance that we will be disappointed. Thus, in his Philosophy of 
Loyalty, Royce calls us to be loyal to loyalty, t o  the building of wider and 
wider and more universal communities. 
Further, because we are temporal beings and time moves on,  there is a 
heavy burden involved in being a moral agent, for "the past returns not; the 
deed once done is never to be recalled; . . . what has been done is at  once the 
world's safest treasure, and its heaviest b ~ r d e n . " ~ '  Royce recognizes, as 
Sartre does not, that the moral burden cannot be borne by one individual 
and that atonement for evil deeds must be a communal affair. Individual 
deeds done and assertions made are irrevocable, but their value can be 
changed by changing the context, by making the world better and truer by 
new deeds and assertions. Further, final judgment of one's deeds, one's 
ideal, need not be made now, for reassessment is possible in the future as 
the context changes with new deeds and new truths to consider. This is why 
Royce opts for universal judgment, for a universal community with the 
total picture, the ultimate vision. 
All morality, namely, IS from this point of view to be judged by the standards of the 
Beloved Community, of the Ideal Klngdom of Heaven.'" 
Cod's love to\\ards the indivrdual IS from the Christian point of men a love for 
one \\hose destrny 11 I S  to be a rnernber o f  ihe Ktngclort~ o f  Heaven. " 
Ultimately, i t  is God's love that constitutes my individuality, my 
uniqueness, for my uniqueness can only be discovered when my relation to 
the total moral order is clear. In The P~.oblem of Christianity, Royce puts it 
thus: 
The World 15 Community. The World contarns its own Interpreter Its processes are 
~nflnlte 111 thew temporal varletles. But therr interpreter, the spir~t of t h ~ s  ~rn~versal 
oommnnlty-never absorbing varletres or perrnitt~n_e thern to blend-conlpares and, 
through a real life, interprets thern all.'" 
This brings us obviously to  Royce's notion of community, but first a 
summary of Royce's theory of self is in order. I shall use P. F. Strawson's 
suggestion that persons are entities to which certain kinds of predicates 
apply, and I shall speak of Royce's self as a process to which certain kinds 
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of predicates apply. They are six in number. First, the Roycean Self is a 
series of physical experiences, processes, states, and behaviors, so that M- 
Predicates (predicates describing physical, publicly observable properties) 
appIy to i t .  Second, the Roycean Self is equally a series of inner experiences, 
states, and processes-thoughts, feelings, emotions, etc.-so that Strawson's 
P-Predicates, denoting consciousness, apply to this SeIf. Third, for Royce, 
the self is a meaning-seeking, meaning-conferring process, so that I -  
Predicates are applicable to it, indicating the intentional nature of con- 
sciousness, e.g., "I perceive ,Y in terms of such and such purposes, and 
certain interests, choices, and acts o f  attention." Fourth, Royce sees the self 
as eni ine~~t ly  social in nature, involving awareness of relations to others 
including their understanding and estimation of us, plus the many exterior 
functions we perform, roles we play, etc., which partly define us. Ap- 
propriate to the self, then, are S-Predicates, indicating the social origin and 
nature of consciousness, e.g., "I am engaging in such and such a social role 
in this situation." Fifth, the self is essentially at1 ethical concept; the self is 
an ideal, a plan. E-Predicates are needed involving the notions of choice, 
rights, and responsibilities, e.g., "I judge this act right or wrong, I am 
guilt)' and subject to punishment," Finally, as indicated at the end of my 
discussion of the Self, there is, for Royce, a need for an R-Predicate, i n -  
dicating a religious dimension to the self, an  eternal dimension. This we 
sliall discuss more fully in the section on community. The latter four 
predicates, added to those of Strawson, indicate the essentially self- 
transcending nature of the self, the capacity to go  beyond the limits of 
present states of self, to seek new goals, to recall the past and anticipate tlie 
future. 
ROYCE'S VIEWS OF COMMUNITY 
Many have noted that one of Royce's most significant contributions to 
human thought is his discussion, in TI7e Problenz of CI7ristianity, of the 
conditions for tlie existence of a community. I t  is important for our present 
discussion that the first condition is "the power of an  individual to extend 
his life, in ideal fashion, s o  as to regard it as including past and future 
events which lie far away in time, and which he does not now personally 
remember.'"' 111 other words, to have community one must have selves who 
have given meaning to their own lives, have chosen their own goals, are 
unique individuals, and are also capable of extending the search for 
meaning beyond their personal plan. However, the community requires 
individuals who d o  not conform to mere social will, but who have 
developed their own self-will in contrast to the social will. By being truly 
individual, the self contributes most to the wealth of the community. 
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The second condition for true community is that there be com- 
munication among selves, communication through attentive listening to the 
ideas and hopes of others. Community is, for Royce, the product of in- 
terpretation. Interpretation is a distinctive form of  mental activity, a third 
form of knowledge, in addition to perception and cognition. Interpretation 
is triadic in character, involving a mediator between two minds. Thus, I am 
mediating the mind and thought of Royce, accessible through a set of signs 
contained in his works, t o  the mind of my hearer or  reader. Three items are 
brought into a determinate relationship by this interpretation: (1 )  I ,  the 
interpreter, who must both understand Royce and know something of my 
audience; (2) the object., Royce's thought; and (3) a mind to whom rhe 
interpretation is addressed. The relationship is non-symmetrical, that is, 
unevenly arranged with respect to all three o f  the terms. If the order of the 
relationship were reversed, it would change the process. 
Interpretation is a temporal process; each of the terms of the relation 
corresponds to the three dimensions of time: past, present, and future. 
Thus, what Royce wrote in the past I am a t  present interpreting to  you for  
your future interpretation. The process is irreversible, partial, and ideally 
infinite. Once I have spoken, what I have said cannot be revoked. But what 
I have said is not the final word, for there will be future interpretations of 
Royce, unless, for arbitrary reasons, the process of interpretation is in- 
terrupted or  permanently stopped. 
Interpretation is a social process, creating a community among 
selves. First of all, in order to interpret Royce to you I had to  take my 
past ideas of Royce, compare them with my present ones, and then 
achieve a new understanding to convey to you. In achieving a new view, 
a new union of my ideas, I have thus transcended my past self. This 
involved an act of will, a n  act of loyalty, and an element of risk. I had 
to choose to re-immerse myself in Royce's thought, and I committed 
myself t o  be loyal to whatever truth I found therein. I had to put beside 
my ideas those of Royce so  that they might interact. And I risked having 
my ideas changed. Further, in conveying Royce's thought to you now, I 
risk being told I a m  wrong, and then the community of interpretation 
must rectify my error. By attending to my interpretation of Royce, you 
chose to enter into the community of Royce's interpreters and you may 
risk having your ideas changed. If the attempt a t  interpretation is suc- 
cessful, a new meaning will come forth and a new unity of conscior~sness 
will be achieved. I will have united your mind with Royce's in a shared 
understanding. 
The crucial elements in interpretation, then, are: (1)  Respect and 
regard for you and Royce as "selves," as dynamos of  ideas, purposes, 
meanings, pursuits; (2) will, the will to interpret, which involves (a) a 
sense of discontent and dissatisfaction both with partial meanings, a 
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narrowness of one's own view o f  things, and with estrangement from 
others a s  carriers of meanings and ideas, and (b) an  aim to unite selves: 
"I seek to bring the three of us into the desired unity of interpretation"; 
and (3) reciprocity and mutuality. There is willingness to play one's part 
in the interpretive process. The listener to whom the interpretation is 
addressed must be kindly and sympathetic. What is gained from a 
process of interpretation is both self-knowledge and community: Self- 
knowledge, because we re-discover who we are and what our ideas and 
goals should be by contrasting them with the ideas and ideals of another. 
Community, because our isolation has been transcended; a new vision 
and an  experiential conspectus have been achieved. 
Indeed, Royce's third condition for community is that unity actually 
be achieved. Each of the individuals involved must share a common past 
a n d / o r  a common future; i.e., it becomes a community of memory 
a n d / o r  a community of hope. Thus, like the self and the process of 
interpretation that builds it, community is a temporal process; it has a 
past and it will have a future. As temporal, community is the bringing 
forth of a n  embodied ideal; a s  in the case of a self, this achievement 
involves deeds done and ends sought. Royce defines a community as a 
"being that attempts to accomplish something in and through the deeds 
of its r n e m b e r ~ . " ~ ~  Like the self, a community is a plan o f  action. 
As the individuality of the self is achieved through a n  act of will and 
loyalty, so  also community involves the commitment of true selves to a 
higher goal or  idea1 they share. The community, like the self, is both 
communal and individual, both one (guided by one ideal) and many (the 
individual members). Royce declares, "a community does not become 
one . . . by virtue of any reduction or melting of these various selves into 
a single merely present self or into a mass of passing e~perience."~'  In a 
true community there must be shared understanding and cooperation, a 
genuine intersubjective interaction and sharing. 
This is quite clearly spelled out in six subconditions Royce outlined 
for the existence of true community. In discussing these I shall draw on 
the fine paraphrase of these subconditions provided by Frank M. Op- 
penheim in his article on Royce and ~ o m m u n i t y . ' ~  The first subcondition 
is that each individual must direct his own deeds of cooperation. In other 
words, participation in the community on the part of each member must 
be fully conscious and fully free. Second, each individual must observe 
the deeds of his fellow members. Each member of the community must 
encourage, stimulate, correct, and enjoy the others' acts, just as d o  
members of a really fine orchestra. 
Third, each individual must know that without this interacting of co- 
working selves, the community could not accomplish its aim. There must 
be mutual appreciation of the efforts of every member and a clear un- 
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derstanding that only by coordinating efforts can the community achieve 
its goals. Only by each playing his part and his instrument can a musical 
composition be performed. Fourth, each must view these present 
cooperative acts as linked to the community's life and hopes. There must 
not be exclilsive preoccupation with the now, or else stagnation will 
occur. There milst be vision and movement forward. The community 
must be truly alive, evolving, future oriented. 
A fifth subcondition of community is that each self identify his own 
life with the ongoing common life of the community. Each self must 
share the goals of the community as its own goals. Finally, other selves 
in the community must concur in accepting each self as a fellow member 
of the community. 
The conditions and subcoriditions of community are presented by 
Royce as ideals that may or  may not be realized on earth. Royce is fully 
aware of the realities of actual human life and communal living. This is 
evidenced in at least two ways. First, in The Problem of Christianity, 
Royce provides a careful analysis of how highly cultivated societies train 
their members both in individualism and collectivism."' The individual 
gains self-consciousness by opposing his will to the social will, while the 
social will inflames self-will. The socially trained individual is taught not 
only to vali~e his own will by opposition to the collective will, but also to 
respect the collective will. This respect appears paradoxical, for it hurts 
those who oppose i t  and helps those who control i t .  Collectivism, by 
training the individual to pride himself on his own will, at the same time 
trains this self in collectivism. "/ndividucrlist?7 atid collecfivisr?? are 
tenclencies, each of which, as orrr socinl order grows, intensifies the 
other. "'l 
A second evidence of Royce's awareness of the realities of com- 
munity life is his understanding of human egoism, a view he often 
discussed. Royce was well aware that community and common con- 
sciousness were hard to come by in the midst of social alienation. He  was 
very much cognizant of original sin, expressed in the tendency to 
isolation and in proneness to betray our  ideals. 
The failure to sound to the depths the original sln of man, the social animal and of the 
natural soclal order he creates-such failure, I repear, lies at the basls of countless 
rn~sinterpretations, both of our modern social problems, and of the nature of a true 
community, and of the conditions wh~ch make possible any %ider philosophical 
generalization of the idea of community."' 
An even further indication of Royce's understanding of the hard 
realities of community life is his analysis, in War and I n s u r a n c e , " ~ f  what 
he called an "essentially dangerous community," namely, any social 
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situation in which only two persons are involved. Between such "dangerous 
pairs" as borrower and lender, plaintiff and defendant, there must step a 
third party, an interpreter, t o  reconcile and mediate the interests o f  the 
pair.J" 
If these are the realities of life, how then can individuals, so prone to  
the narrowing of consciousness, ever achieve the kind of extension of self 
required for true community? This can happen only through love, through 
the yearning for unity with other selves. Even though this goal may seem 
unattainable, the will must postulate the wholeness in which true in- 
dividuality achieves its meaning. 
Therefole ou r  Ideal extensions of the self, when a c  love the  community, and  long t o  
r ea l~ze  ~ t s  l i f e u ~ t h  intimacy, must needs take the  fo rm of ucring us~f  u~eco~rldsurve.~, In 
iome  slngle ~111lty of ~ n s ~ g h t ,  that wealth and  varlety o f  connect~or i  whlch, a s  a fact, we 
cannot make  present t o  ou r  momentary  
The love that Royce has in mind never loses sight of the individuality 
and special calling of each member of the community, and it sees the 
successful cooperation of all its members bringing about that which the 
individual member most eagerly loves as his own fulfillment." To illustrate 
the ~lnity sought in community and the love needed, Royce draws upon our 
human experience of love. 
Thtrik of the cloresr unlry of human souls that yo11 hnow. Then conceive o f  t he  
Kingdom In term5of S L I C ~  love. When friends really joln hand5 and hearts and Ilvec, ~t is 
not the mere collect~on of sundered organisms a n d  o f  d~v lded  feelings and  will that these 
frlends vie\\ ttielr life Thelr life, a s  friend\, is the  unity which, nhl le  above their o \ \n  
lebel, \\Ins them to ltself a n d  glves them mean~ng. '" 
Such love Royce recognizes as something more than human. "The 
problem of love is human. The solution of the problem, if it comes at all, 
will be, in its meaning, superhuman and divine, if there be anything 
divine."'$ Royce, then, as we have already partially seen, has added one 
more dimension to  the self and to community, namely, the eternal. 
Royce discusses the concept of the eternal in a number o f  contexts.50 In 
many places he describes it in terms o f  the totnlsimrrl, the all-at-once vision 
of the Absolute in which the whole picture is given, each individual life plan 
and ideal uniquely and mutually contrasting with each other ideal. Thus, 
Royce writes: 
Never In the present llfe d o  we find the  Self a\ a glven and reallzed fact. I t  15 for us a n  
Ideal Its t rue  place is In the  eternal \corld, where all plans are fulfilled. In God  alone d o  
b$e fully come to  lino\b oourselvec. There  alone d o  we hno\r even a s  \be a re  knonn . "  
JOSIAH ROYCE ON SELF AND COMMUNITY 45 
There is another sense of the eternal that I believe has support in Royce's 
thought. I t  is the sense of loyalty to the eternaI in working continuously to 
transcend selfish, partial individualism, to seek broader truth, broader 
selves, broader community. The work of interpretation asks us to transcend 
all stopping places, all dyadic relations, all dangerous dualisms that bind us 
to  partial views: materialism versus spiritualism, individualism versus 
collectivism, egoism versus utilitarianism. That such a commitment to the 
eternal is crucial to Royce's view of the self and community is evident in his 
writings. The moral self and the moral community, he claims, are com- 
mitted to making the world ever better. 
The best rvorld for a ~ n o r a l  agent rs one that needs kntl to wake it better. The purely 
metaphysical conrciousness, in vain, therefore, says of the good, It is. The moral 
consciousness inslstq upon settlng higher than every such assertloll, the resolve, Let it 
be. The moral consclousnesg declines to accept, therefore, any metaphysical final~ty. I t  
reject5 every statlc world." 
The scientific community, which Royce constantly cites as an example 
of true community, is endlessly committed to  newer and broader truth, 
"The very existence of natural science, then, is an illustration of our thesis 
that the universe is endlessly engaged in the spiritual task of interpreting its 
own life."53 And even in the area of religion, Royce concludes, "We can 
look forward, then, to no final form either of Christianity or  of any special 
religion. But we can look forward to a time when the work and the insight 
of religion can become as progressive as is now the work of ~cience ."~ '  
The eternal is a necessary part of our search for self and community 
because it provides the sense of the total vision in which all true in- 
dividuality is achieved. That sense urges the will to continual self- 
transcendence so that no final stopping point is arbitrarily set and no final 
judgment is prematurely made. 
CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE O F  ROYCE'S 
VIEWS ON SELF AND COMMUNITY 
In explicating Royce's views on self and community, I have limited 
myself to interpretation. I am aware that there are aspects of Royce's 
philosophy that have been considered obscure or  to which some ob- 
jections can be made. Rather than engage in such a clarifying o r  critical 
project here, I will point to certain insights of Royce's that I believe can 
not only survive criticism, but also furnish illumination for perplexing 
philosophical problems of the present time. 
It is my conviction that Royce's view of both self and community 
provides a healthy corrective, first, t o  the atomic individualism of the 
Existentialist school with its notion of an  individual self that is what it is 
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in self-contained, independent existence. Such a view makes a travesty of 
relationships with other selves, for all forms of togetherness of selves 
become accidental and external, because relations with other selves 
constitute no essential part of the self that is related. All forms of 
community, then, become mere collectivisms, threatening the in- 
dividuality of selves. Further, the existential self is a lonely, forlorn, 
anxious self; although other selves are unimportant to the project of self- 
achievement, they are always there ready to judge us in our success or 
failure. Recall Sartre's classic line in No Exit, "Hell is-other p e ~ p l e . " ~ '  
Royce, in his understanding of the self as purpose and ideal, surely 
would find himself in harmony with contemporary artempts to identify 
the individual person with freedom-even sin, for Royce, is an act of 
free choice. "To sin is to consciously choose to forget, through a 
narrowing of the field of attention, an Ought that one already 
 recognize^."^^ However, Royce recognizes that absolute freedom is a 
concept with burdensome and dangerous consequences, If a self is only 
its freedom, it has nothing outside itself that might qualify, direct, and 
give meaning to its freedom. There is nothing to urge the self on to self- 
transcendence, something that Royce recognizes as necessary to self- 
development. T o  Sartre Royce would probably say, 
the Self seems to stand within its own realm, as a sort of absolute authority, over 
against any external will or knowledge that pretends to determine its own nature, or 
its precise lim~ts, or its meanlng. . . . It is thus a separate entity, in its essence 
unapproachable . . . possessing perhaps ~ t s  own unalienable rights, the unit of all 
ethlcal order, the centre of its own universe . . . the pr~ncipal problem for any such 
realistic Individualism, always becomes the questlon of how this Self, whose Interests 
are essent~ally its own, can rat~onally come to recognize any responsibility to other 
Selves or to God, or to any Absolute Ought beyond its own caprice." 
Further, Royce sees that the moral burden is too  great for one in- 
dividual. First of all, once a deed has been done, it is irrevocable-as Sartre, 
in No Exit, makes so  vividly clear-"I am, and to the end of endless time 
shall remain, the doer of that willfulIy traitorous deed. Whatever other 
value I may get, that value I retain forever. My guilt is as enduring as 
time."58 
Second, usually the deed hurts others; the community is involved and 
even the community cannot undo an irrevocable fact of evil that has been 
perpetrated. But the community can bring the doer back into communal 
relation, and new creative acts done by others in the community can make 
the world better than it was before the blow of treason fell.'' For Royce, 
guilt and responsibility make sense and can be borne only in a communal 
context. Hell is not necessarily other people; rather, Ioyalty to  a com- 
munity, particularly to the principle of community itself, is a way to 
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salvation, a way to  transcend the narrowness of vision that leads to sinful 
acts, a way to a better, more universal worId. 
All rnorality, namely, i5, from this point of vlew, to be judged by the standards of the 
Beloved Commun~ty,  of the  deal Kingdom of Heaven. Concretely stated, thi5 means 
that you are to test every course of actlon nor by the question: What can we find in the 
parables or in the Sermon on the Mount. . . . The central doctrine of  the Master was: 
"So act so that the Kingdom of Heaven may come.'"h~s means: So act as to help, 
however you can, and whenever you can, towards maklng mank~nd one loving 
brotherhood, whose love is not a mere affection for morally detached ~ndividuals, 
but a love of the unity of ~ t s  own life upon its own divine level, and a love of in- 
dividuals in so far as they can be raised to communion with t h ~ s  piritual community 
itself." 
Royce's assertion is that there is no  contradiction between being a 
unique individuaf and finding oneself involved in a loyal and cooperative 
effort with many individuals. This is a needed corrective to the notion of the 
self as a pure project of freedom and to any call for boot-strap in- 
dividualism. In a time when the world is becoming highIy complex and 
interdependent, such a call addressed exclusively to the individual is futile 
and even dangerous-as current events in Iran and elsewhere tell us. 
Royce's emphasis on community and his call for a philosophical un- 
derstanding of community are especially important in an increasingly in- 
terdependent world. T o  deal with dangerous conflicts, the interpretive, 
mediating process of community building advocated by Royce needs to be 
explored in depth by both philosophers and social scientists. True types of  
community need t o  be distinguished from dangerous, false communities, 
such as those exhibited in fanatical religions and cults in which the in- 
teraction and growth of selves are not genuine. Questions concerning the 
size of communities and their interrelations need to be discussed and ex- 
plored with new vigor. 
Royce can be seen as a bridge builder between two contemporary and 
competing approaches to the study of community in the social sciences. 
Either individualism, which views society as merely a collection of in- 
dividuals and its every property as a resultant or  aggregation of  properties 
of  its members, or holism, which views society as a totality transcending its 
membership and as endowed with properties that cannot be traced back 
either to  the properties of its members or  to their interactions, have 
dominated contemporary sociology. It is refreshing ro see Mario Bunge 
advocate a new system, which appears very Roycean in spirit and un- 
derstanding, namely, the view that "a society is a system of interrelated 
individuals, i.e., a system, and while some of its properties are aggregations 
of properties of its components, others derive from the relationships among 
the latter.''6' 
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Royce's attempt to combine creatively the twin aspects of individual- 
community, freedom-order, is equally a corrective t o  the dominant 
reductionism of the behaviorists, who would reduce self to the external 
conditions of existence, or of the identity-theory materialists, who would 
explain behavior in terms of brain states. As we have seen, Royce fully 
recognizes the role of genetic, physiological, and behavioral components 
in the development of self. Royce's self is both embodied and part of its 
environment. However, he acknowledges both the role of inner, con- 
scious states in determining human behavior and the intentionality of 
consciousness. Both have been denied by the behaviorists. Psychologists 
Walter and Harriet MischeI succinctly describe the inadequacy of  the 
behaviorist view: 
B. F. Sklnner (1974) and other rad~cal behaviorists make a polnt of avoidlng 
"pseudo-explanations" by refus~ng to invoke e~ther  the self o r  the person as a causal 
agent. Instead they attribute the "control" (cause) of behav~or,  includ~ng the 
behaviors in "self-control," to the ~ n d ~ v ~ d u a l ' s  env~ronmental and genetic history. 
Such an extreme emphasis on the environment successfully avoids animism and 
"ghosts," but i t  does so at considerable costs. I t  ignores the ways In which the 
~ n d ~ v ~ d u a l  tr nsfortns the environment psychologically, processing informat~on about 
events selectively and constructively In light of h ~ s  or her own psychological state, 
monitoring his own behavior and intervening actlvely between the impinging stimulus 
and the response that is ultimately generated. It also Ignores the fact that behavior 
reflect? a contlnuour interaction between person and condit~ons rather than a one- 
\bay Influence process In which the environment molds the person." 
We have already noted how, early in his philosophical career, Royce 
had argued against any form of pure empiricism and had talked of the 
transforming that the self performs on the given: 
the present datum means something to us, implies something, leads over to a deed of 
some sort, arouses a response, sets us at the bus~ness of ideal~zlng ~ t s  contents. And we 
proceed to idealize these contents by giving them a place in our attention only in case it 
somehow cooperates in our business of defining our own purposes as thinkers who 
conceive the world as a s y ~ t e m . ~ '  
Royce further recognized that to  deny the self-constructive features of 
human experience is to contribute to the lack of critical reflection on the 
nature of the scientific enterprise itself. The scientist-in-action is a creative 
knower, an interpreter and selector of data. Observation is a highly selective 
process, data collection is always guided by a hypothesis; theory and ob- 
servation are closely intertwined. Royce was well aware of this long before 
Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Husserl's The 
Crisis of the European  science^.^^ In his study of science, Royce had 
concluded that one  must fully recognize both the interpretive nature of 
human consciousness and the fact that science is a human endeavor with 
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certain guiding ideals and purposes as well as with the very real stubborn- 
ness of facts. 
We report facts; \belet the facts speak; but, we, as  we Investigate, In the popular phrase, 
"talk-back" to the facts. We Interpret as well as report. Man IS not merely made for 
science, but sclence is made for man It expresses h ~ s  deepest iritellectual need5, as well 
as h ~ s  careful obsercattonr. I t  i.; an effort to brlng internal meantngs into harmony tiith 
euernal verlftcations. I t  attempts to control as well a? to ~ u b m ~ t ,  to concene wit11 
ratiorial unlty, as  %ell as to accept data. The theor~es of sclence are human, as \\ell 
a? objective, ~rlterrially rational, as well as (\\hen that IS poss~ble) subject to external 
te5t5 '' 
Further, returning to the self-controlling, transforming features of 
human experience cited by the Mischels and always affirmed by Royce, it 
must be clear that to deny such features is to deny human responsibility and 
the ethical and valuational aspects of human life. This denial is clearly seen 
in a number of B. F. Skinner's writings. The travesty this denial makes of 
ethical judgment is well established by Brand Blanshard in a printed debate 
between him and Skinner. 
"We cannot make men stop htlllng each other," says Profes~or Sk~nner,  "by chang~ng 
thelr feel~ngs " Why educate t h e ~ r  feelrngs at all, one wonders, ~f not even the hatred of 
a H~tler  or the jealousy of an Othello can make the slightest difference in \\hat they do? 
It seems equally p o ~ n t l e s ~  to educate men to reflect, for the fores~ght of the con- 
sequences of t h e ~ r  conduct can never affect that conduct. Indeed, k t  I S  hard to see nhy,  
In a behaviorist world, any con5equences should be better than any other. Why should I 
nor Impose s~tfferlng on others if t t  17 only a mentallstlc unreal~ty? Fortunately, 
Profe5sor Sktnner 1s so unreasonable a behav~orist as  to be a b~ndly and cons~derate 
man.&' 
The denial of the value dimension of human experience that is a con- 
sequence of a strict behaviorism is a dangerous thing in an age when 
scientists are being forced to deal more and more with value questions 
arising out of scientific inquiry itself. Who, for example, will decide how 
widely and which behavior modification techniques should be used, in- 
cluding such techniques as p3ycho-surgery and electrical stimulation of the 
brain? 
Royce's view that the self is essentially an ethical concept is sorely 
needed today, as is his view of science as a community of interpretation, 
loyal to  the never-ending search for truth and never content to rest with one 
final answer. In contrast to reductionistic atomism and existentialist in- 
dividualism, Royce asserts that i t  is arrogant to say either that the self has 
no meaning or  that i t  alone creates itself. Self and community arise in a 
mutually creating, ongoing, infinite process. T o  claim to  understand fully 
either self or  community in mutual isolation or as creating one another is to 
pick an arbitrary stopping place in the interpretation process. Let me end 
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this interpretation of Royce and of his significance for today with his own 
words: 
the pliilosopher's \\ark 1s not lost mhen, In one sense, his system seems to have been 
refuted by death and when time seems to have scattered to scorn the bords of his dust- 
f~lled mouth. His Immediate end may have been unattained; but thousands of yearsmay 
not be long enough to develop for humanity the fulI significance of his reflective 
t h o ~ g h t . ~ '  
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